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ABSTRACT 
 
This study, using the Viet Nam Governance and Public Administration Performance Index 
(PAPI) surveys, examines the effect of monitoring local authorities on the quality of 
governance and public services in Vietnam. PAPI randomly selected 200 locations in 93 
districts of 30 provinces to conduct survey in 2010 and rolled out nationally in 2011 and 
2012. Using 2011 and 2012 survey data, we compare these provinces and their districts with 
those that were not surveyed in 2010. Theories suggest that local authorities may improve 
their behavior if they have been surveyed and know that they are being monitored. In this 
paper, we find that governance quality reported by citizens in the surveyed provinces and 
districts of the 2010 PAPI survey is significantly higher than in other locations. This 
monitoring improves a wide range of governance aspects, including local participation in 
village decisions, transparency of local decision-making, accountability, administrative 
procedures, and public service delivery. 
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1. Introduction 
Improving people’s welfare is what economic development is all about. Delivery of good and 
sufficient public services is an important function of the government to improve welfare of 
people. Transparency, defined as the ability of to observe and evaluate governments, allows 
citizens to hold the agent accountable, which can improve public service delivery.2 Better 
access to information seems to force politicians to respond more appropriately to citizen 
demands, in both developed countries (Alt, Lassen and Skilling, 2002) and developing countries 
(Besley and Burgess, 2002; Besley et al., 2006; Brunetti and Weder, 2003). 
 Vietnam has achieved high economic growth since the economic reform (Doi moi) in 
1986. The annual growth rate of GDP is around 7 percent during the past two decades. People’s 
living standards have been improved. However, poverty reduction is slowing down and at 
around 20 percent in 2010 (World Bank, 2012). A large number of studies document large gaps 
in access to public services between rural and urban people, Kinh and ethnic minorities (for 
instance, see Pham et al., 2011; World Bank, 2012). 
 Together with social-economic development, there is an increasing expectation about 
public services, in terms of not only accessibility but also quality (CECODES, FR, CPP & 
UNDP, 2012).  In addition, recognition on the role of governance and public administration 
on economic growth and human development is also increasing in Vietnam (Acuña-Alfaro et 
al., 2010). Vietnam has performed the Public Administration Reform since 1990s (Painter, 
2003; UNDP, VFF and CECODES, 2009). Good and effective governance can help economic 
growth and poverty reduction (Aron, 2000; Grindle, 2004; Martin, 2006; Khan, 2008). For 
Vietnam’s provinces, the Human Development Index (HDI) is positively correlated with the 
Viet Nam Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) (UNDP, 2011; 
CECODES, FR, CPP & UNDP, 2012).  
 As an attempt to improve the governance and public administration, United Nations 
Development Program, Vietnam Fatherland Front, and Centre for Community Support & 
Development Studies have implemented surveys on the Viet Nam Governance and Public 
Administration Performance Index (PAPI) since 2009. The surveys measure people’s 
experiences when interacting with local government on different aspects and construct an 
aggregate index – the Viet Nam Governance and Public Administration Performance Index 
(PAPI)  (CECODES, FR, CPP & UNDP, 2012). 
 It is important to note the existing and influential Provincial Competitiveness Index 
(PCI), which is a local governance measure based on businesses’ survey and ranks all 
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provinces in Vietnam in terms of their business environment. When PCI was first launched by 
Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) in 2005, there were strong objections 
and criticisms from some provinces and cities. However, over time PCI has become accepted 
and popular. A web search of the term "Chỉ số năng lực cạnh tranh cấp tỉnh" returns 985,000 
results. VCCI statistic indicates that 40 provincial people’s committees have stated that 
improving PCI ranking is an official objective in their resolutions.  
However, PCI focuses only on business environment and leaves out local governance 
and public services for citizens. PAPI emerged to address this important gap. Therefore, there 
is anticipation that PAPI will become another important and inevitable measure of local 
governance, as PCI has. Given it is the first and only independent tool to measure the quality 
of local governance and services, local authorities are likely to expect that their performance 
will be at least partly measured against this new index. Therefore, the implementation of 
PAPI can make local authorities to improve their service and accountability, which will be 
evaluated by citizens in eminent PAPI surveys. 
 Using the PAPI data, this study aims to investigate the effect of supervision and 
monitoring of local governance on the governance quality and public service delivery. . There 
are two main research questions that the study aims to answers: (i) To what extent do the 
supervision and monitoring of local governance by PAPI strengthen local governance? (ii) To 
what extent do the supervision and monitoring of local governance by PAPI improve the 
quality of the public service delivery. 
As known, measuring the level of the governance supervision and monitoring is very 
challenging. Even if we can come up with a measure, there is very a little chance for the 
measure to be exogenous. The endogeneity problem can cause bias in the estimation of the 
effect of the government supervision and monitoring.  
In this study, we propose to use the PAPI survey as a proxy of supervision 
intervention of local governance. There are evidences that the central government as well as 
local governments have been paying more attention to PAPI as a reference tool in monitoring 
the governance quality and public administration reform (CECODES, FR, CPP & UNDP, 
2012). The main innovation of this measurement approach is that communes are randomly 
selected into PAPI, and as a result the treatment can be considered as a randomized 
experiment. The randomized design can provide the estimator of the impact with highly 
robust internal validity (Duflo, 2006, Duflo et al., 2008, Abhijit et al., 2008). In addition, the 
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PAPI data are national representative, andsimilar governance surveys are also implemented in 
other countries.3 Thus the impact evaluation can provide good external validity.  
The paper is structured into six sections. The second section presents a brief overview of 
related literature. The third and fourth sections present the data sets and estimation 
methodology used in this study, respectively. Next, the fifth section discusses the empirical 
results from the estimation of the effect of governance supervision by PAPI surveys on 
governance quality and public service delivery. Finally, some conclusions and policy 
implicates are presented in the sixth section.  
2. Literature review 
Transparency, defined as the ability of to observe and evaluate governments, allows citizens to 
hold the agent accountable, which reduces corruption and improves public service delivery.4 
Better access to information seems to force politicians to respond more appropriately to citizen 
demands, in both developed countries (Alt et al., 2002) and developing countries (Besley and 
Burgess, 2002; Besley et al.,2006; Brunetti and Weder, 2003). 
There is a strong theoretical basis for the argument that transparency can prove an 
insufficient foundation for holding politicians accountable in the presence of an uninformed 
electorate. Buchanan (1989) demonstrated that when citizens lack information, they are unable 
to effectively sanction the behavior of politicians, who can use the opportunity to engage in 
corruption, self-dealing, or catering to more informed constituents (Besley and Burgess, 2002). 
Because politicians value holding office, they have an incentive to serve their citizens’ interests 
and behave honestly (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986). As a result, in non-transparent 
environments, the accountability between citizens and their public servants is much weaker (Alt 
et al., 2002; Besley and Burgess, 2002; Lassen, 2005). 
A number of studies have found empirical support for most of the nodes in the causal 
chain linking transparency to improved government behavior. First, there is observational 
evidence that well-informed citizens act to hold their officials accountable. More informed 
citizens are more likely pressure (Lassen, 2005) and ensure that the fruits of the political process 
are brought home to their localities (Strömberg, 2004). There is also evidence that politicians 
respond to greater transparency with better performance. Better access to information seems to 
force politicians to respond more appropriately to citizen demands, in both developed countries 
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(Alt et al., 2002) and developing countries (Besley and Burgess 2002; Besley et al., 2006; 
Brunetti and Weder, 2003). 
Despite the impressive array of work demonstrating the benefits of transparency, there is 
by no means a consensus on the matter. An alternative literature has struggled to identify the 
micro logic between increased openness, the actions of citizens, and public sector performance 
(Bauhr and Grimes, 2011; Golden and Picci, 2008). Another set of scholars worry that increased 
media attention can damage officials’ performance by providing the opportunity for politicians to 
manipulate evaluation, rather than working to enact the most socially beneficial legislation 
(Canes-Wrone et al., 2001; Maskin and Tirole, 2004; Datta, 2008). 
On the one hand, better information about political behavior may allow media and civil 
society to report on political abuses and embarrass political leaders, creating “millions of 
auditors” (Kaufman and Bellver, 2005), as a substitute for direct accountability through 
elections and citizens (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006; Smulovitz and Perruzzotti, 2000). This 
logic builds off the fire alarm style of public monitoring first emphasized by McCubbins and 
Schwartz (1984). In complex economic and social systems, it can be costly and inefficient for 
central government officials to perform police-patrol-style monitoring, in which agents 
personally inspect every action made by subordinate government officials and delegates. An 
alternative strategy is to move to a fire alarm approach, where citizens or media “pull the alarm” 
when they see wrongdoing. This allows the central government to respond to the abuse without 
the cost of daily inspection of every subordinate government activity. For fire alarm monitoring 
to be successful, however, states must increase the openness of information to citizens so they 
can play this monitoring role.  
Yet, this approach relies on the untested assumption that alternative mechanisms can 
substitute for downward accountability to citizens through elections (Joshi, 2010). Two variants 
of this assumption are employed by practitioners. A weak version suggests that public shaming 
creates a sufficient incentive for the local government to change their behavior. A stronger 
version of the assumption is that, once alerted, central officials will punish self-dealing and 
corruption. This same logic lies behind the Chinese government’s decision to enact its own 
Open Governance Initiative (OGI) with assistance from the Yale Law Center (Horsley, 2008; 
Ma and Wu, 2011). Although the OGI was initiated by the Chinese state itself and applies to 
subordinate officials, international donors have also sought to export the logic of this approach 
to other contexts, arguing that the public shaming or the threat of central punishment will 
incentivize public officials to change their behavior (Joshi, 2010).  
In Vietnam, the PAPI is the first tool for citizens to monitor local governance and 
public services, which is provided independently by a civic organization in collaboration with 
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international donor. The implementation of PAPI was rolled out gradually and randomly, 
providing a unique opportunity to evaluate the effect of monitoring on the quality of 
governance and services. The next section describes the data that we use to conduct this 
evaluation. 
 
3. Data sources 
In this study, we propose to use data from the two following sources. The main data source is 
surveys of the Viet Nam Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI). 
The PAPI surveys are annually conducted by the United Nations Development Program, 
Vietnam Fatherland Front, and Centre for Community Support & Development Studies since 
2009 (CECODES, FR, CPP & UNDP, 2012). The surveys collected information from citizens 
on their experiences on a large number of aspects related to governance and public 
administration. Citizens are also asked about their satisfaction levels with different 
government organizations at local and central levels.  More detailed description of the PAPI 
surveys can be found in CECODES, FR, CPP & UNDP (2012) and CECODES, VFF-CRT & 
UNDP (2013). 
In 2010, the PAPI survey was conducted in 91 districts in 30 provinces (covered 5,560 
citizens). In 2011 and 2012, all 63 provinces were included in the sampling. 207 districts are 
covered in the 2011 survey as well as 2012 survey (the 2011 and 2012 survey used the same 
sample of communes and districts). There are 40 districts are sampled in all the three surveys: 
the 2010, 2011 and 2012 PAPI surveys. The PAPI surveys in 2011 and 2012 covered 13,642 
and 13,747 respondents, respectively. In this study, we will all the three available PAPI 
surveys in 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
In addition, we also used the VHLSSs which were conducted by the General Statistics 
Office of Vietnam (GSO) with technical support from World Bank (WB) in every two years 
from 2002 to 2010. The surveys contain individual, household, and commune data. Individual 
and household data include basic demography, employment, education, health, income, 
expenditure, housing, durables, social protection. Commune data include demography, 
geographic, economic conditions and aid programs, employment, agricultural production, 
infrastructure and transportation, education, health, and social affairs. VHLSS 2010 covered 
9,344 households. Information on commune characteristics is collected from 2,181 rural 
communes. Data are representative for urban/rural and six geographical regions.  
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4. Methodology 
Estimating a causal effect of a policy is always challenging because of selection bias. There 
are a large number of interventions on governance and public administration reforms in 
Vietnam, and to our knowledge there has been no randomized experiment on one of these 
interventions. Recently, Malesky et al. (2012) examine a quasi-experimental intervention of 
removal of district People Councils in Vietnam. However, without randomized elements of 
interventions, there is always a potential bias in quasi-experimental studies.  
 In this study, we do not measure the effect of a well-defined intervention on 
governance supervision. If the government implements an intervention on governance 
supervision per se, it is almost impossible to randomize the intervention. Instead, we use the 
PAPI survey as a proxy of supervision intervention of local governance. There are evidences 
that the central government has been paying more attention to PAPI as a reference tool in 
monitoring the governance quality and public administration reform (CECODES, FR, CPP & 
UNDP, 2012). At the provincial level, several provinces such as Kon Tum, Da Nang and Ho 
Chi Minh cities also use information from PAPI for policies on public governance 
improvement (CECODES, FR, CPP & UNDP, 2012).  
For communes and districts that are sampled randomly in the PAPI surveys, leaders 
are aware of PAPI. Leaders are increasingly aware that citizens in their places have been and 
will report experiences in local governance and administration. Being observed and reported 
by citizens through PAPI surveys might promote the leaders to improve the governance 
quality. In this study, we propose to use the implementation of the PAPI surveys as a proxy of 
supervision of local governance. We will measure the effect of communes being selected in 
the PAPI surveys on both governance and public service delivery outcomes.  
The main advantage of the above approach is that communes are randomly selected 
into PAPI. As a result, the treatment can be considered as a randomized experiment. As 
known, the randomized design is an emerging method which can provide the ideal estimator 
of impact evaluation with robust internal validity (Duflo, 2006, Duflo et al., 2008, Abhijit et 
al., 2008). In addition, the PAPI data are national representative, and similar governance 
surveys are also implemented in other countries.5 The impact evaluation, therefore, can 
provide good external validity.  
In this study, we will examine the effect of the PAPI surveys on different outcomes 
including governance and public administration and public services. Firstly, we measure the 
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effect of the selection of provinces in the 2010 PAPI survey on the governance quality in the 
2012 PAPI survey as follows: 
                          ipippip XPAPIY εγβα +++= 2010,2012, ,   (1) 
where 2012,ipY is an indicator of governance quality of individual i in province p, measured in 
the 2012 PAPI survey. 2010,pPAPI is the dummy variable indicating whether the province p 
was also surveyed in the 2010 PAPI survey. ipX is a vector of control variables. 
Secondly, we measure the effect of the selection of districts in the 2010 PAPI survey 
on the governance quality in the 2012 PAPI survey as follows: 
                          ididdid XPAPIY εγβα +++= 2010,2012, ,              (2) 
where 2012,idY is an indicator of governance quality of individual i in district d, measured in the 
2012 PAPI survey. 2010,dPAPI is the dummy variable indicating whether the district d was 
surveyed in the 2010 PAPI survey. idX is a vector of control variables. For both model (1) and 
(2), we use a small set of exogenous control variables including population of provinces, 
population of districts, dummy whether headquarter of provinces is located in districts, and 
type of cities.  
 We also run regressions of similar specifications as equation (1) and (2) with the 
dependent variables of the 2011 PAPI to examine whether there is an effect of the 2010 PAPI 
in the respondents in the 2011 PAPI.  
There are two points that should be noted in the above models. Firstly, in the 2010 
PAPI surveys, except Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city are selected purposely, 28 provinces are 
randomly selected. Thus, households from Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city are dropped from the 
sample.  Secondly, in all the three PAPI surveys, urban districts in which there are 
headquarters of provinces or cities are always selected. It means that the treatment group is 
urban districts. Thus we drop all rural households from regressions. The number of 
households used in regressions in equation (1) and (2) is 7,597 individuals.   
 
5. Empirical results 
Measuring governance quality and public administration is challenging, since governance and 
public administration are multidimensional. In this study, we follow the approach of 
composite indexes in CECODES, FR, CPP & UNDP (2012) and CECODES, VFF-CRT & 
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UNDP (2013). According to these studies, the governance quality and public administration is 
measured by six dimensions: participation of people at the local level, transparency of 
governance, vertical accountability, control of corruption, public administrative procedures, 
and public service delivery. Each dimension is comprised of several sub-dimensions. The 
sub-dimensions are also measured by composite indexes which are computed from several 
indicators. The six dimensions are measured on a scale from 1 to 10 in which 1 means poorest 
performance and 10 means the best performance of governance and public administration. 
The definition of the aggregate indexes of dimensions is presented in detail in CECODES, 
FR, CPP & UNDP (2012) and CECODES, VFF-CRT & UNDP (2013). 
Based on the six dimensions, CECODES, FR, CPP & UNDP (2012) and CECODES, 
VFF-CRT & UNDP (2013) construct an overall composite measure of governance and public 
administration index called PAPI index. This index is weighted sum (or unweighted sum) of 
the indexes of the six dimensions. The PAPI varies from 6 (lowest possible score) to 60 
scores (maximum possible score), with higher scores meaning better governance (for more 
detailed presentation of the aggregate PAPI indexes, see CECODES, FR, CPP & UNDP, 
2012; and CECODES, VFF-CRT & UNDP, 2013).  
 Table 1 reports regressions the 2012 PAPI and the indexes of six dimensions on the 
dummy variable indicating whether provinces were surveyed in the 2010 PAPI. This table 
shows the effect of provinces being surveyed in the 2010 PAPI on the perception of 
individuals about the governance quality in the 2012 PAPI. There are no control variables in 
regressions in Table 1. As mentioned above, the sample for regression includes only urban 
individuals and there are no individuals from Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city. Interestingly, the 
effect of the 2010 PAPI survey is positive and statistically significant in all the dimensions. 
The weighted PAPI increases by 0.8. Since the average weighted PAPI is 39, the effect of the 
2010 PAPI survey on the weighted PAPI is around 2.1 percent. The effect of the unweighted 
PAPI is also positive and statistically significant.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 In Table 2, several control variables are added in the regressions. The effect of the 
2010 PAPI survey on the governance indexes in the 2011 PAPI is also positive and 
statistically significant in all the dimensions expect for the dimension ‘control of corruption’. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 Tables 3 and 4 present the regression of people’s satisfaction about the governance. 
The PAPI 2011 contains data on the satisfaction level of people about different State 
organizations at different levels. Again, people in provinces that were surveyed in the 2010 
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PAPI are more likely to have higher satisfaction about governance than those in provinces not 
sampled in the 2012 PAPI. These findings imply that using governance surveys as a 
monitoring tool of local governance can help improve the governance quality and public 
administration procedures. 
[Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
Tables 5 to 6 present the regression of the governance indexes and satisfaction level 
about the governance on the dummy variable of districts being sampled in the 2010 PAPI 
survey. Similarly, the effect is positive and statistically significant in the regression of the 
PAPI indexes. However, for the dimension of Accountability and Control for Corruption, the 
effect of districts being sampled in the 2010 PAPI survey is not statically significant.  
Regarding the overall satisfaction of citizens about the governance quality, the effect 
of districts being sampled in the 2010 PAPI also have the significant and positive effect in 
most aspects. The effect is not significant on the Satisfaction About District People 
Committee,  Satisfaction About Province People Committee and Satisfaction About Province 
People Committee.  
Tables A.1 to A.6 in Appendix present the replicated estimation of the effect of the 
2010 PAPI on the 2011 PAPI indexes. Overall, there is also a positive effect of the 2010 PAPI 
on the citizens’ experiences about the governance and public administration in 2011. 
It should be noted that CECODES, FR, UNDP (2011) conduct a balancing test to test 
the differences in outcomes between provinces that are sampled in the 2010 PAPI survey and 
provinces not sampled in the 2010 PAPI survey. The outcome means of the sampled and non-
sampled provinces are similar. In this study, we also test whether characteristics of 
households in the sampled provinces and households in the non-sampled provinces are 
statistically different. We use the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys in 2010. 
Tables A.7 to A.12 present the regressions. In almost all regressions, there are no statistically 
significant effects of the 2010 PAPI survey on household and commune outcomes.  
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Table 1: Regressions of the 2012 PAPI indexes on the provinces covered in the 2010 PAPI: without control variables 
Explanatory variables 
Weighted 
PAPI in 2011 
Unweighted 
PAPI in 2011 
Dimension 1: 
Quality of 
Participation 
in Village 
Decisions 
Dimension 2: 
Transparenc
y of Local 
Decision-
Making 
Dimension 3: 
Downward 
Accountability 
Dimension 4: 
Control of 
Corruption 
Dimension 5: 
Administrative 
Procedures 
Dimension 6: 
Public 
Service 
Delivery 
Provinces covered in PAPI 2010 0.811*** 0.807*** 0.064*** 0.169*** 0.086*** 0.075*** 0.278*** 0.135*** 
 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.025) (0.011) (0.007) 
Constant 38.910*** 36.749*** 5.202*** 5.850*** 5.651*** 5.867*** 6.936*** 7.242*** 
 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.018) (0.007) (0.005) 
Observations 7697 7697 7697 7697 7697 7697 7697 7697 
R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.024 0.010 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2012 PAPI survey 
 
Table 2: Regressions of the 2012 PAPI indexes on the provinces covered in the 2010 PAPI: with control variables 
Explanatory variables 
Weighted 
PAPI in 2011 
Unweighted 
PAPI in 2011 
Dimension 1: 
Quality of 
Participation 
in Village 
Decisions 
Dimension 2: 
Transparenc
y of Local 
Decision-
Making 
Dimension 3: 
Downward 
Accountability 
Dimension 4: 
Control of 
Corruption 
Dimension 5: 
Administrative 
Procedures 
Dimension 6: 
Public 
Service 
Delivery 
Provinces covered in PAPI 2010 0.625*** 0.618*** 0.031* 0.129*** 0.062*** 0.042 0.244*** 0.110*** 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.026) (0.011) (0.007) 
Provincial People Committee is located 
in districts 
0.525*** 0.368*** 0.123*** 0.194*** 0.001 -0.120*** 0.060*** 0.110*** 
(0.059) (0.058) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.028) (0.011) (0.008) 
Total population of district in 2009 
-1.401*** -3.136*** -0.646*** -0.825*** -0.898*** -0.762*** -0.433*** 0.428*** 
 
(0.363) (0.390) (0.145) (0.104) (0.085) (0.158) (0.082) (0.053) 
Total population of province in 2009 
-0.663*** -0.716*** -0.152*** -0.165*** -0.107*** -0.245*** -0.017** -0.030*** 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.022) (0.009) (0.006) 
City class 1 0.755*** 0.802*** 0.109*** 0.068** 0.086*** 0.133*** 0.257*** 0.149*** 
 
(0.089) (0.090) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.039) (0.018) (0.011) 
Constant 39.706*** 37.956*** 5.439*** 6.107*** 5.924*** 6.358*** 6.980*** 7.148*** 
 
(0.075) (0.078) (0.025) (0.022) (0.019) (0.034) (0.015) (0.010) 
Observations 7594 7594 7594 7594 7594 7594 7594 7594 
R-squared 0.023 0.028 0.014 0.018 0.014 0.012 0.036 0.035 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2012 PAPI survey 
 
  
12 
 
Table 3: Regressions of the 2012 satisfaction about governances on the provinces covered in the 2010 PAPI: without control variables 
Explanatory variables 
Satisfaction 
About 
Village Head 
Satisfaction 
About 
Commune 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
District 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
Province 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
Government 
Your 
Satisfaction 
About 
National 
Assembly 
Your 
Satisfaction 
About 
Commune 
Security 
Satisfaction 
About 
District Court 
Provinces covered in PAPI 2010 1.490*** 1.788*** 1.838*** 1.944*** 0.750** 1.374*** 1.956*** 1.229*** 
 
(0.203) (0.215) (0.264) (0.313) (0.311) (0.296) (0.250) (0.310) 
Constant 86.718*** 83.941*** 84.567*** 85.428*** 88.164*** 88.506*** 83.592*** 85.266*** 
 
(0.149) (0.155) (0.175) (0.190) (0.178) (0.177) (0.164) (0.177) 
Observations 7261 6572 4738 4055 4275 4231 6348 3951 
R-squared 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2012 PAPI survey 
 
Table 4: Regressions of the 2012 satisfaction about governances on the provinces covered in the 2010 PAPI: with control variables 
Explanatory variables 
Satisfaction 
About 
Village Head 
Satisfaction 
About 
Commune 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
District 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
Province 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
Government 
Your 
Satisfaction 
About 
National 
Assembly 
Your 
Satisfaction 
About 
Commune 
Security 
Satisfaction 
About 
District Court 
Provinces covered in PAPI 2010 1.190*** 1.560*** 1.532*** 1.810*** 0.922*** 1.566*** 1.431*** 0.991*** 
 
(0.209) (0.226) (0.285) (0.338) (0.337) (0.321) (0.261) (0.317) 
Provincial People Committee is located 
in districts 
1.389*** 0.792*** -0.161 -0.598* -0.791*** 0.242 2.300*** -0.026 
(0.229) (0.235) (0.285) (0.313) (0.283) (0.268) (0.252) (0.307) 
Total population of district in 2009 
-5.002*** -1.905 -0.367 -9.176** -12.246*** -13.908*** -7.422*** -7.981** 
 
(1.442) (1.542) (1.902) (3.723) (4.397) (4.250) (2.202) (3.093) 
Total population of province in 2009 
-0.217 -0.798*** -0.630*** 0.289 -0.915*** -0.261 -0.834*** -0.440* 
 
(0.164) (0.185) (0.196) (0.219) (0.205) (0.199) (0.195) (0.223) 
City class 1 1.932*** 0.397 1.255*** 1.813*** -1.352*** -1.223*** 1.938*** 1.440*** 
 
(0.268) (0.311) (0.426) (0.444) (0.454) (0.442) (0.359) (0.469) 
Constant 87.011*** 84.919*** 85.469*** 86.681*** 91.803*** 91.069*** 84.824*** 87.077*** 
 
(0.293) (0.306) (0.377) (0.566) (0.634) (0.599) (0.396) (0.530) 
Observations 7161 6479 4664 3995 4210 4167 6255 3889 
R-squared 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.014 0.014 0.010 0.005 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2012 PAPI survey. 
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Table 5: Regressions of the 2012 PAPI indexes on the districts covered in the 2010 PAPI: with control variables 
Explanatory variables 
Weighted 
PAPI in 2011 
Unweighted 
PAPI in 2011 
Dimension 1: 
Quality of 
Participation 
in Village 
Decisions 
Dimension 2: 
Transparenc
y of Local 
Decision-
Making 
Dimension 3: 
Downward 
Accountability 
Dimension 4: 
Control of 
Corruption 
Dimension 5: 
Administrative 
Procedures 
Dimension 6: 
Public 
Service 
Delivery 
Districts covered in PAPI 2010 0.440*** 0.314*** -0.041* 0.087*** 0.001 -0.059 0.206*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.035) (0.014) (0.010) 
Provincial People Committee is located 
in districts 
0.388*** 0.277*** 0.139*** 0.167*** 0.003 -0.097*** -0.006 0.070*** 
(0.066) (0.065) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.031) (0.012) (0.008) 
Total population of district in 2009 -1.540*** -3.231*** -0.631*** -0.852*** -0.897*** -0.741*** -0.499*** 0.389*** 
 
(0.362) (0.387) (0.143) (0.103) (0.084) (0.157) (0.081) (0.053) 
Total population of province in 2009 -0.676*** -0.731*** -0.154*** -0.168*** -0.109*** -0.247*** -0.022** -0.031*** 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.022) (0.009) (0.006) 
City class 1 0.936*** 0.972*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.100*** 0.138*** 0.331*** 0.184*** 
 
(0.085) (0.086) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.038) (0.018) (0.011) 
Constant 39.955*** 38.210*** 5.455*** 6.159*** 5.952*** 6.381*** 7.075*** 7.189*** 
 
(0.068) (0.071) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.031) (0.014) (0.009) 
Observations 7594 7594 7594 7594 7594 7594 7594 7594 
R-squared 0.020 0.025 0.014 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.027 0.033 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2011 PAPI survey 
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Table 6: Regressions of the 2012 satisfaction about governances on the districts covered in the 2010 PAPI: with control variables 
Explanatory variables 
Satisfaction 
About 
Village Head 
Satisfaction 
About 
Commune 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
District 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
Province 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
Government 
Your 
Satisfaction 
About 
National 
Assembly 
Your 
Satisfaction 
About 
Commune 
Security 
Satisfaction 
About 
District Court 
Districts covered in PAPI 2010  0.774*** 1.097*** 0.560 0.496 0.889** 1.298*** 1.010*** 0.381 
 
(0.269) (0.287) (0.365) (0.397) (0.387) (0.369) (0.311) (0.409) 
Provincial People Committee is located 
in districts 
1.142*** 0.418 -0.339 -0.755** -1.110*** -0.221 1.965*** -0.128 
(0.255) (0.267) (0.303) (0.339) (0.325) (0.311) (0.265) (0.315) 
Total population of district in 2009 
-5.258*** -2.194 -0.518 -9.165** -12.549*** -14.312*** -7.721*** -8.052** 
 
(1.432) (1.532) (1.884) (3.678) (4.338) (4.200) (2.179) (3.046) 
Total population of province in 2009 
-0.238 -0.836*** -0.688*** 0.191 -0.918*** -0.281 -0.868*** -0.473** 
 
(0.164) (0.184) (0.195) (0.219) (0.203) (0.198) (0.194) (0.222) 
City class 1 2.273*** 0.857*** 1.699*** 2.323*** -1.037** -0.695* 2.385*** 1.719*** 
 
(0.262) (0.301) (0.397) (0.401) (0.394) (0.386) (0.335) (0.447) 
Constant 87.497*** 85.572*** 86.159*** 87.527*** 92.170*** 91.714*** 85.419*** 87.501*** 
 
(0.254) (0.270) (0.325) (0.473) (0.535) (0.504) (0.342) (0.455) 
Observations 7161 6479 4664 3995 4210 4167 6255 3889 
R-squared 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.014 0.012 0.009 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2011 PAPI survey 
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6. Concluding remarks 
Using the PAPI data, this study examines the effect of supervision and monitoring of local 
governance on the governance quality and public service delivery with two main research 
questions: (i) To what extent do the supervision and monitoring of local governance by 
PAPI strengthen local governance? (ii) To what extent do the supervision and monitoring 
of local governance by PAPI improve the quality of the public service delivery.  
 We found that the 2010 PAPI survey has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on public administration and governance in both 2011 and 2012. The positive effect 
is found in most dimensions of governance and public administration except for the 
dimension of control of corruption. The weighted PAPI and unweighted PAPI in 2012 is 
also increased by around 2.1 percent by the 2010 PAPI survey. The satisfaction level of 
people about local and central governance is also increased. These findings imply that 
using governance surveys as a monitoring tool of local governance can help improve the 
governance quality and public administration.   
 The findings in this paper have several policy implications. First, it is worthwhile 
to consider expanding the geographical coverage of PAPI. If PAPI were merely a 
monitoring tool then the current small sample would be sufficient. However, since PAPI is 
effective in improving local governance, it is desirable to expand PAPI’s coverage to more 
districts and communes to improve their governance. Second, knowing the effectiveness 
of PAPI, we should consider exploring similar approaches in other public arenas. 
Ministries and government agencies in Vietnam provide a wide range of public services to 
citizens. Having a PAPI-style tool to improve transparencyand services provides by 
ministries and government agencies would be greatly beneficial. Finally, the results here 
may have implications for transparency programs in countries that are trying to improve 
their local governance. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Regressions of the 2011 PAPI indexes on provinces covered in PAPI 2010: without control variables 
Explanatory variables 
Weighted 
PAPI in 2011 
Unweighted 
PAPI in 2011 
Dimension 1: 
Quality of 
Participation 
in Village 
Decisions 
Dimension 2: 
Transparenc
y of Local 
Decision-
Making 
Dimension 3: 
Downward 
Accountability 
Dimension 4: 
Control of 
Corruption 
Dimension 5: 
Administrative 
Procedures 
Dimension 6: 
Public 
Service 
Delivery 
Provinces covered in PAPI 2010 0.445*** 0.548*** 0.093*** 0.101*** 0.141*** -0.013 0.151*** 0.075*** 
 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.005) 
Constant 38.382*** 36.773*** 5.267*** 5.640*** 5.534*** 6.334*** 6.930*** 7.069*** 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) 
Observations 7597 7597 7597 7597 7597 7597 7597 7597 
R-squared 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2011 PAPI survey 
 
Table A.2: Regressions of the 2011 PAPI indexes on provinces covered in PAPI 2010: with control variables 
Explanatory variables 
Weighted 
PAPI in 2011 
Unweighted 
PAPI in 2011 
Dimension 1: 
Quality of 
Participation 
in Village 
Decisions 
Dimension 2: 
Transparenc
y of Local 
Decision-
Making 
Dimension 3: 
Downward 
Accountability 
Dimension 4: 
Control of 
Corruption 
Dimension 5: 
Administrative 
Procedures 
Dimension 6: 
Public 
Service 
Delivery 
Provinces covered in PAPI 2010 0.449*** 0.572*** 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.145*** 0.016 0.157*** 0.064*** 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006) 
Provincial People Committee is located 
in districts 
1.078*** 0.796*** 0.192*** 0.259*** 0.143*** -0.052*** -0.023** 0.278*** 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.006) 
Total population of district in 2009 0.258 0.629*** 0.026 -0.186*** -0.168*** 1.281*** 0.058 -0.383*** 
 
(0.201) (0.200) (0.049) (0.063) (0.058) (0.080) (0.048) (0.030) 
Total population of province in 2009 
-0.027 -0.278*** -0.060*** -0.108*** -0.084*** -0.071*** -0.083*** 0.128*** 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) 
City class 1 
-0.399*** -0.618*** -0.079*** -0.112*** -0.073*** -0.403*** -0.086*** 0.134*** 
 
(0.056) (0.058) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.013) (0.007) 
Constant 37.916*** 36.718*** 5.257*** 5.703*** 5.607*** 6.279*** 7.047*** 6.825*** 
 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.010) (0.007) 
Observations 7507 7507 7507 7507 7507 7507 7507 7507 
R-squared 0.018 0.014 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.014 0.010 0.049 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2011 PAPI survey 
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Table A.3: Regressions of the 2011 satisfaction about governance on provinces covered in PAPI 2010: without control variables 
Explanatory variables 
Satisfaction 
About 
Village Head 
Satisfaction 
About 
Commune 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
District 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
Province 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
Government 
Your 
Satisfaction 
About 
National 
Assembly 
Your 
Satisfaction 
About 
Commune 
Security 
Satisfaction 
About 
District Court 
Provinces covered in PAPI 2010 3.005*** 1.440*** 1.213*** 1.585*** 1.497*** 1.620*** 2.603*** 2.339*** 
 
(0.195) (0.205) (0.212) (0.246) (0.231) (0.225) (0.215) (0.276) 
Constant 83.583*** 82.621*** 83.566*** 85.060*** 89.511*** 90.174*** 81.600*** 83.309*** 
 
(0.121) (0.120) (0.136) (0.164) (0.147) (0.145) (0.158) (0.178) 
Observations 7050 6226 4221 3472 3725 3696 5999 3412 
R-squared 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2011 PAPI survey 
 
Table A.4: Regressions of the 2011 satisfaction about governance on provinces covered in PAPI 2010: with control variables 
Explanatory variables 
Satisfaction 
About 
Village Head 
Satisfaction 
About 
Commune 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
District 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
Province 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
Government 
Your 
Satisfaction 
About 
National 
Assembly 
Your 
Satisfaction 
About 
Commune 
Security 
Satisfaction 
About 
District Court 
Provinces covered in PAPI 2010 2.946*** 1.433*** 1.548*** 2.190*** 1.975*** 1.944*** 2.675*** 2.762*** 
 
(0.199) (0.210) (0.218) (0.250) (0.242) (0.234) (0.226) (0.302) 
Provincial People Committee is located 
in districts 
1.990*** 1.588*** -0.088 -1.690*** -1.511*** -1.091*** 2.290*** 1.003*** 
(0.207) (0.224) (0.233) (0.251) (0.235) (0.234) (0.229) (0.281) 
Total population of district in 2009 
-2.963** -4.772*** 7.057*** -1.414 -2.211** 2.984*** -3.134*** 2.530 
 
(1.373) (0.821) (0.912) (1.053) (0.932) (0.977) (1.049) (1.659) 
Total population of province in 2009 
-0.357** 0.637*** -0.269 1.531*** 0.942*** 0.594*** 0.694*** 1.197*** 
 
(0.161) (0.170) (0.189) (0.218) (0.201) (0.196) (0.194) (0.227) 
City class 1 
-0.026 0.122 -3.271*** -4.865*** -5.059*** -2.821*** -1.268*** -1.890*** 
 
(0.250) (0.310) (0.376) (0.377) (0.396) (0.288) (0.389) (0.428) 
Constant 83.604*** 81.781*** 83.174*** 84.671*** 89.823*** 89.695*** 80.257*** 81.017*** 
 
(0.273) (0.254) (0.298) (0.348) (0.296) (0.329) (0.271) (0.468) 
Observations 6967 6147 4161 3425 3675 3645 5924 3366 
R-squared 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.016 0.017 0.009 0.008 0.006 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2011 PAPI survey. 
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Table A.5: Regressions of the 2011 PAPI indexes on districts covered in PAPI 2010: with control variables 
Explanatory variables 
Weighted 
PAPI in 2011 
Unweighted 
PAPI in 2011 
Dimension 1: 
Quality of 
Participation 
in Village 
Decisions 
Dimension 2: 
Transparenc
y of Local 
Decision-
Making 
Dimension 3: 
Downward 
Accountability 
Dimension 4: 
Control of 
Corruption 
Dimension 5: 
Administrative 
Procedures 
Dimension 6: 
Public 
Service 
Delivery 
Districts covered in PAPI 2010 0.453*** 0.455*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.079*** -0.023 0.117*** 0.105*** 
 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.020) (0.011) (0.007) 
Provincial People Committee is located 
in districts 
0.932*** 0.652*** 0.163*** 0.231*** 0.119*** -0.044** -0.060*** 0.243*** 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.007) 
Total population of district in 2009 0.112 0.503** -0.002 -0.212*** -0.182*** 1.295*** 0.028 -0.423*** 
 
(0.203) (0.202) (0.049) (0.063) (0.058) (0.081) (0.048) (0.031) 
Total population of province in 2009 -0.028 -0.283*** -0.061*** -0.109*** -0.086*** -0.072*** -0.085*** 0.129*** 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) 
City class 1 -0.258*** -0.450*** -0.050*** -0.082*** -0.033** -0.401*** -0.040*** 0.158*** 
 
(0.054) (0.056) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.012) (0.007) 
Constant 38.079*** 36.933*** 5.291*** 5.739*** 5.663*** 6.287*** 7.106*** 6.846*** 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.006) 
Observations 7507 7507 7507 7507 7507 7507 7507 7507 
R-squared 0.017 0.012 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.014 0.006 0.051 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2011 PAPI survey 
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Table A.6: Regressions of the 2011 satisfaction about governance on districts covered in PAPI 2010: without control variables 
 
Explanatory variables 
Satisfaction 
About 
Village Head 
Satisfaction 
About 
Commune 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
District 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
Province 
People 
Committee 
Satisfaction 
About 
Government 
Your 
Satisfaction 
About 
National 
Assembly 
Your 
Satisfaction 
About 
Commune 
Security 
Satisfaction 
About 
District Court 
Districts covered in PAPI 2010  3.402*** 2.319*** 2.046*** 2.549*** 2.327*** 2.128*** 2.548*** 1.674*** 
 
(0.279) (0.286) (0.304) (0.326) (0.343) (0.324) (0.291) (0.419) 
Provincial People Committee is located 
in districts 
0.846*** 0.784*** -0.828*** -2.619*** -2.359*** -1.869*** 1.387*** 0.405 
(0.218) (0.221) (0.244) (0.265) (0.245) (0.240) (0.253) (0.291) 
Total population of district in 2009 -4.013*** -5.653*** 6.225*** -2.579** -2.973*** 2.263** -3.779*** 0.716 
 
(1.372) (0.838) (0.924) (1.060) (0.970) (0.990) (1.056) (1.613) 
Total population of province in 2009 -0.362** 0.672*** -0.227 1.607*** 0.971*** 0.608*** 0.679*** 1.143*** 
 
(0.161) (0.171) (0.191) (0.220) (0.203) (0.197) (0.194) (0.228) 
City class 1 0.908*** 0.662** -2.693*** -4.100*** -4.448*** -2.189*** -0.473 -1.015** 
 
(0.244) (0.305) (0.370) (0.370) (0.386) (0.282) (0.373) (0.404) 
Constant 84.664*** 82.248*** 83.744*** 85.475*** 90.552*** 90.440*** 81.286*** 82.388*** 
 
(0.238) (0.228) (0.273) (0.315) (0.263) (0.287) (0.243) (0.399) 
Observations 6967 6147 4161 3425 3675 3645 5924 3366 
R-squared 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.015 0.017 0.008 0.006 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2011 PAPI survey 
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Table A.7. Regression of household outcomes in the 2010 VHLSS on districts covered in the 2010 PAPI 
Explanatory variables 
Log of per 
capita 
income 
Log of per 
capita 
expenditure 
Household 
size 
Proportion 
of 
household 
members 
aged <15 
Proportion 
of 
household 
members 
aged > 60 
Household 
head 
completed 
high school 
Living area House with 
solid roof 
House with 
tap water 
House with 
motorbike 
Districts covered in PAPI 2010  0.005 -0.035 0.027 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -1.564 0.012 0.046 0.026 
 
(0.047) (0.041) (0.094) (0.013) (0.018) (0.037) (4.023) (0.032) (0.034) (0.022) 
Provincial People Committee is 
located in districts 
0.174*** 0.317*** -0.108 -0.037** 0.019 0.189*** 10.845** 0.172*** 0.296*** 0.033 
(0.057) (0.054) (0.110) (0.016) (0.022) (0.044) (4.659) (0.043) (0.054) (0.030) 
Total population of district in 
2009 
-0.304* -0.428** 0.902** 0.117* -0.091 -0.257* -42.328** -0.836*** -0.230 0.042 
(0.180) (0.170) (0.415) (0.060) (0.062) (0.137) (17.911) (0.137) (0.172) (0.082) 
Total population of province in 
2009 
0.107*** 0.097*** -0.106 -0.022* 0.013 0.068** 6.758 0.172*** 0.038 0.004 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.086) (0.012) (0.016) (0.028) (4.634) (0.027) (0.036) (0.020) 
City class 1 0.058 0.183*** 0.077 0.006 0.013 0.038 2.159 0.039 0.251*** 0.053** 
 
(0.049) (0.046) (0.103) (0.015) (0.022) (0.040) (4.522) (0.037) (0.038) (0.023) 
Constant 9.592*** 9.579*** 3.832*** 0.225*** 0.105*** 0.281*** 73.484*** 0.079* 0.405*** 0.790*** 
 
(0.063) (0.061) (0.120) (0.018) (0.026) (0.046) (5.399) (0.047) (0.060) (0.035) 
Observations 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1213 1215 1215 1215 
R-squared 0.018 0.057 0.007 0.009 0.003 0.024 0.011 0.065 0.113 0.008 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2010 VHLSS. 
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Table A.8 Regression of household outcomes in the 2010 VHLSS on provinces covered in the 2010 PAPI 
Explanatory variables 
Log of per 
capita 
income 
Log of per 
capita 
expenditure 
Household 
size 
Proportion 
of 
household 
members 
aged <15 
Proportion 
of 
household 
members 
aged > 60 
Household 
head 
completed 
high school 
Living area House with 
solid roof 
House with 
tap water 
House with 
motorbike 
Provinces covered in PAPI 
2010  
0.007 -0.014 0.029 0.015 -0.007 -0.008 0.795 0.035 0.036 0.028 
(0.043) (0.039) (0.086) (0.012) (0.016) (0.033) (3.634) (0.028) (0.034) (0.021) 
Provincial People Committee 
is located in districts 
0.175*** 0.309*** -0.102 -0.035** 0.019 0.189*** 10.564** 0.175*** 0.306*** 0.039 
(0.056) (0.054) (0.107) (0.016) (0.020) (0.043) (4.539) (0.042) (0.054) (0.029) 
Total population of district in 
2009 
-0.304* -0.448*** 0.904** 0.111* -0.086 -0.252* -44.324** -0.853*** -0.218 0.043 
(0.177) (0.168) (0.411) (0.060) (0.062) (0.134) (17.610) (0.136) (0.170) (0.081) 
Total population of province 
in 2009 
0.107*** 0.097*** -0.106 -0.021* 0.012 0.068** 6.873 0.174*** 0.038 0.005 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.086) (0.012) (0.016) (0.028) (4.616) (0.027) (0.036) (0.020) 
City class 1 0.057 0.186*** 0.074 0.005 0.013 0.038 2.198 0.036 0.245*** 0.049** 
 
(0.048) (0.045) (0.104) (0.015) (0.022) (0.040) (4.483) (0.037) (0.039) (0.023) 
Constant 9.590*** 9.580*** 3.825*** 0.220*** 0.108*** 0.284*** 72.977*** 0.067 0.397*** 0.783*** 
 
(0.065) (0.063) (0.125) (0.019) (0.026) (0.048) (5.484) (0.047) (0.060) (0.036) 
Observations 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1213 1215 1215 1215 
R-squared 0.018 0.057 0.007 0.010 0.003 0.024 0.010 0.067 0.113 0.009 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2010 VHLSS. 
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Table A.9. Regressions of commune outcomes in the 2010 VHLSS on provinces covered in the 2010 PAPI 
Explanatory variables 
Village with 
12-moths 
road 
Commune 
has public 
transport 
Socioecono
mic 
development 
and 
infrastructure 
Tap water 
is the main 
source of 
water in the 
communes 
Village with 
road 
Proportion 
of 
households 
receiving 
crop 
support 
Proportion 
of 
households 
receiving 
agricultural 
extension 
Proportion 
of 
households 
receiving 
agriculture 
tax 
exemption 
Commune 
with 
agriculture 
extension 
center 
Commune 
with 
irrigation 
plants  
Provinces covered in PAPI 
2010 
-0.008 0.011 -0.008 -0.074 -0.030 0.039 -0.006 -0.010 0.017 0.059 
(0.044) (0.050) (0.036) (0.062) (0.038) (0.025) (0.006) (0.031) (0.013) (0.044) 
Provincial People Committee 
is located in districts 
0.150*** -0.103 -0.091 0.179 0.090*** -0.045** -0.015 -0.106*** 0.047 -0.065 
(0.036) (0.091) (0.097) (0.120) (0.032) (0.021) (0.010) (0.027) (0.049) (0.095) 
Total population of district in 
2009 
0.568*** 1.260*** -0.813** 1.319*** 0.058 -0.692*** -0.186*** -1.099*** -0.037 0.150 
(0.211) (0.194) (0.311) (0.353) (0.195) (0.155) (0.035) (0.200) (0.094) (0.243) 
Total population of province 
in 2009 
0.015 0.005 -0.047 0.022 0.019 0.034 0.002 0.026 -0.004 0.029 
(0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.020) (0.023) (0.006) (0.026) (0.010) (0.027) 
City class 1 0.057 -0.095 0.211*** -0.088 0.044 0.072 0.005 -0.028 -0.025** 0.028 
 
(0.051) (0.095) (0.044) (0.137) (0.042) (0.050) (0.012) (0.029) (0.013) (0.064) 
Constant 0.694*** 0.524*** 0.785*** 0.132* 0.852*** 0.115*** 0.063*** 0.271*** 0.058*** 0.587*** 
 
(0.054) (0.064) (0.043) (0.077) (0.045) (0.031) (0.011) (0.053) (0.017) (0.048) 
Observations 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 
R-squared 0.017 0.034 0.033 0.052 0.008 0.069 0.014 0.044 0.005 0.007 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2010 VHLSS. 
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Table A.10. Regressions of commune outcomes in the 2010 VHLSS on provinces covered in the 2010 PAPI 
Explanatory variables 
Proportion 
of 
households 
supported 
healthcare 
fee 
Commune 
has public 
health 
project 
Commune 
has 
education 
and culture 
project 
Proportion 
of 
households 
supported 
tuition fee 
Commune 
with upper 
secondary 
school 
Commune 
with 
kindergarten 
Commune 
with 
broadcast 
Commune 
with post 
office 
Proportion 
of 
households 
supported 
credit 
Commune 
with market 
or inter 
commune 
market 
Provinces covered in PAPI 
2010 
-0.019 0.018 0.040 -0.003 0.024 0.028 0.041 0.007 0.088 -0.011 
(0.025) (0.021) (0.037) (0.003) (0.022) (0.064) (0.050) (0.026) (0.101) (0.036) 
Provincial People Committee 
is located in districts 
-0.041 -0.116*** -0.116 -0.000 -0.091 0.051 0.082* 0.086** -0.021 -0.143 
(0.028) (0.032) (0.071) (0.008) (0.060) (0.096) (0.048) (0.041) (0.044) (0.097) 
Total population of district in 
2009 
-1.013*** -0.252 -0.657** -0.165*** 0.245 0.248 1.406*** -0.280 -1.343*** 1.520*** 
(0.213) (0.153) (0.249) (0.027) (0.164) (0.373) (0.303) (0.209) (0.434) (0.215) 
Total population of province 
in 2009 
0.007 -0.002 0.031 0.003 0.003 0.018 0.075** 0.017 0.049 0.021 
(0.028) (0.016) (0.032) (0.004) (0.014) (0.036) (0.035) (0.019) (0.052) (0.024) 
City class 1 0.006 0.054*** -0.022 0.001 0.028 0.160*** -0.007 0.022 0.064 -0.032 
 
(0.027) (0.018) (0.042) (0.005) (0.029) (0.055) (0.068) (0.031) (0.059) (0.047) 
Constant 0.236*** 0.168*** 0.366*** 0.042*** 0.136*** 0.554*** 0.507*** 0.903*** 0.193 0.414*** 
 
(0.044) (0.027) (0.048) (0.005) (0.031) (0.070) (0.081) (0.033) (0.120) (0.047) 
Observations 2086 2096 2096 2086 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 
R-squared 0.088 0.006 0.010 0.079 0.004 0.014 0.101 0.005 0.002 0.049 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2010 VHLSS. 
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Table A.11. Regressions of commune outcomes in the 2010 VHLSS on districts covered in the 2010 PAPI 
Explanatory variables 
Village with 
12-moths 
road 
Commune 
has public 
transport 
Socioecono
mic 
development 
and 
infrastructure 
Tap water 
is the main 
source of 
water in the 
communes 
Village with 
road 
Proportion 
of 
households 
receiving 
crop 
support 
Proportion 
of 
households 
receiving 
agricultural 
extension 
Proportion 
of 
households 
receiving 
agriculture 
tax 
exemption 
Commune 
with 
agriculture 
extension 
center 
Commune 
with 
irrigation 
plants  
Districts covered in PAPI 
2010 
0.002 0.043 0.019 0.003 -0.046 0.012 -0.004 0.048 -0.007 0.059 
(0.048) (0.040) (0.049) (0.056) (0.045) (0.022) (0.008) (0.034) (0.013) (0.050) 
Provincial People Committee 
is located in districts 
0.143*** -0.135 -0.112 0.137 0.115*** -0.035 -0.014 -0.154*** 0.062 -0.087 
(0.040) (0.092) (0.102) (0.123) (0.034) (0.022) (0.011) (0.037) (0.049) (0.100) 
Total population of district in 
2009 
0.570*** 1.263*** -0.809** 1.336*** 0.060 -0.699*** -0.185*** -1.091*** -0.042 0.143 
(0.210) (0.194) (0.314) (0.343) (0.194) (0.151) (0.036) (0.199) (0.096) (0.246) 
Total population of province 
in 2009 
0.016 0.006 -0.046 0.025 0.019 0.033 0.002 0.028 -0.005 0.028 
(0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.019) (0.021) (0.006) (0.027) (0.011) (0.025) 
City class 1 0.058 -0.094 0.212*** -0.080 0.046 0.068 0.005 -0.025 -0.027** 0.023 
 
(0.050) (0.097) (0.044) (0.131) (0.040) (0.047) (0.013) (0.029) (0.013) (0.069) 
Constant 0.689*** 0.523*** 0.777*** 0.090 0.843*** 0.135*** 0.061*** 0.257*** 0.069*** 0.610*** 
 
(0.048) (0.063) (0.043) (0.068) (0.038) (0.033) (0.011) (0.046) (0.016) (0.040) 
Observations 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 
R-squared 0.017 0.035 0.033 0.045 0.008 0.059 0.014 0.046 0.003 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2010 VHLSS. 
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Table A.12. Regressions of commune outcomes in the 2010 VHLSS on provinces covered in the 2010 PAPI 
Explanatory variables 
Proportion 
of 
households 
supported 
healthcare 
fee 
Commune 
has public 
health 
project 
Commune 
has 
education 
and culture 
project 
Proportion 
of 
households 
supported 
tuition fee 
Commune 
with upper 
secondary 
school 
Commune 
with 
kindergarten 
Commune 
with 
broadcast 
Commune 
with post 
office 
Proportion 
of 
households 
supported 
credit 
Commune 
with market 
or inter 
commune 
market 
Districts covered in PAPI 
2010 
0.009 0.003 0.042 -0.004 0.008 0.064 -0.036 -0.001 0.058 -0.020 
(0.025) (0.028) (0.043) (0.002) (0.025) (0.056) (0.050) (0.034) (0.066) (0.044) 
Provincial People Committee 
is located in districts 
-0.059* -0.109*** -0.132* 0.002 -0.085 0.009 0.135** 0.090* -0.026 -0.131 
(0.031) (0.036) (0.070) (0.009) (0.062) (0.108) (0.060) (0.051) (0.044) (0.101) 
Total population of district in 
2009 
-1.008*** -0.255 -0.661** -0.165*** 0.241 0.249 1.393*** -0.281 -1.357*** 1.520*** 
(0.215) (0.156) (0.249) (0.027) (0.166) (0.370) (0.309) (0.210) (0.443) (0.214) 
Total population of province 
in 2009 
0.008 -0.003 0.030 0.003 0.002 0.019 0.072* 0.017 0.047 0.021 
(0.030) (0.017) (0.030) (0.004) (0.016) (0.035) (0.037) (0.019) (0.048) (0.024) 
City class 1 0.009 0.052*** -0.025 0.001 0.026 0.159*** -0.013 0.022 0.056 -0.032 
 
(0.029) (0.019) (0.042) (0.005) (0.031) (0.057) (0.070) (0.031) (0.047) (0.046) 
Constant 0.224*** 0.178*** 0.381*** 0.041*** 0.148*** 0.559*** 0.537*** 0.907*** 0.233*** 0.412*** 
 
(0.043) (0.027) (0.045) (0.006) (0.028) (0.063) (0.077) (0.032) (0.078) (0.046) 
Observations 2086 2096 2096 2086 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 2096 
R-squared 0.086 0.006 0.009 0.079 0.003 0.015 0.099 0.005 0.001 0.049 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation from the 2010 VHLSS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
